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This paper studies whether a seller achieves higher profits by providing consumers with 
information that allows them to distinguish between products from different countries, 
and how mandatory provision of such information impacts welfare.  We analyze a model 
of multi-product monopoly with horizontal differentiation and random country-specific 
input costs.  We find that if the variability in the input costs is sufficiently high and the 
share of consumers with high valuations is in some intermediate range, the seller prefers 
to withhold information about product origin.  Mandatory labeling of products with their 
country of origin may reduce or increase welfare depending on the share of consumers 
with high valuations.  We also discuss extensions of the basic model that allow for 
continuous distributions of valuations and input costs, and consumer learning.   
  2Country of Origin Labeling with Horizontal Differentiation and Cost Variability 
1. Introduction 
Until recently voluntary country-of-origin labeling of food products was relatively 
uncommon in the U.S. even though the aggregate import share grew to 7% of value and 
15% of volume of domestic food consumption in 2005 (Jerardo 2008).
1  In 2009, the 
mandatory country of origin labeling (MCOOL) regulation contained in the 2002 and 
2008 Farm Security and Rural Investment Acts took effect (Federal Register 2009).  This 
labeling regulation requires food retailers to notify their customers of the country of 
origin of various muscle cuts and ground meats, fish, perishable agricultural commodities 
(fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables), and nuts.
2  The goal of this paper is to evaluate 
the impact of the MCOOL policy on welfare in markets in which product origin provides 
an important cue to consumers who have different rankings of products from different 
countries.
3
  While the food imported into the U.S. is subjected to the same safety standards as 
domestically grown food, production methods may still vary across exporting countries 
(Krissoff et al 2004).
4  Such variability tends to result in unique flavor or nutritional 
content (and other experience or credence attributes) of food products from different 
countries (Umberger et al 2002).  For example, several recent studies tested whether there 
were sensory and value differences among U.S. consumers for grass-fed Argentine and 
Australian, grain-fed Canadian, and U.S. corn-fed beef.  Umberger et al (2002) found that 
                                                 
1 An example of voluntary labeling of food products with their country of origin are lamb imports from 
Australia and New Zealand (Clemens and Babcock 2004).  Also, there are many examples of the use of 
geographical origin within the U.S. as a basis for branding commodities such as Main lobster, Kona coffee, 
Idaho potatoes, Napa Valley wine, Vidalia onions, Washington State apples, Texas Ruby Red grapefruits, 
and Florida orange juice (Agarwal and Barone 2005, Babcock et al 2007, Babcock and Clemens 2004). 
2 In 2001, the U.S. imported 11.6% of beef, 83.3% of fish and shellfish, 23.1% of fruits, and 16.6% of 
vegetables covered under MCOOL (GAO 2003, p. 19). 
3 A comprehensive survey of the various arguments put forth by proponents and opponents of MCOOL is 
provided in Krissoff et al (2004).  More recent discussions are available in Lusk et al (2006), Carter et al 
(2006), and Verbeke and Roosen (2009). 
4 Required country of origin labeling does not directly improve food safety or traceability since as 
explained by the U.S. Department of Agriculture “the COOL program is neither a food safety or 
traceability program, but rather a consumer information program. Food products, both imported and 
domestic, must meet the food safety standards of the FDA and FSIS. Food safety and traceability are not 
the stated intent of the rule and the COOL program does not replace any other established regulatory 
programs that related to food safety or traceability.” (Federal Registar 2009, p. 2679, italics added). 
  362% of consumers preferred U.S. beef, 23% preferred Argentine beef, and 15% were 
indifferent.  Sitz et al (2005) reported similar results for U.S. and Australian beef.  They 
also found that, when offered to choose between U.S. and Canadian beef, 44% of 
consumers preferred the domestic sample, 29% preferred the Canadian sample, and 27% 
were indifferent.  In their experiments, consumers bid, on average, from 30% to 60% 
more for their preferred variety of beef.   
To the extent that these estimates reflect real-world consumer preferences, and 
using the (upper) estimate of the average increase in the total costs due to country of 
origin labeling of 5.6% (Federal Register 2009, p.2690)
5, it appears that retailers forego 
considerable profits by not labeling beef with the country of origin.
6  Why do U.S. 
retailers prefer to “commoditize” beef as well as other products with experience or 
credence attributes that are country-specific by withholding information about product 
origin (Krissoff et al 2004)?
7  
Most of the previous studies of product origin labeling in markets with vertical 
differentiation consider producers who cannot credibly signal some characteristics of 
their products and use geographical indications (GIs) as a means of costly credible 
certification of quality (e.g., Zago and Pick 2004, Lence et al 2007, Langinier and 
Babcock 2008, Moschini et al 2008).
8  In such cases labeling regulation (GIs) allows 
                                                 
5 This is the sum of the percentage increases in operating costs following the introduction of MCOOL for 
producers (1.3%), processors (2.1%), and retailers (2.2%) of beef, lamb, and goat.  USDA projects that the 
costs of implementing MCOOL will fall over time (Federal Register 2009, p. 2690).  
6 As Umberger et al (2002), p.492 pointed out: “Most of the beef imported into the United States is not 
labeled as imported beef; it is marketed as generic beef, and it is not distinguishable from domestic beef in 
the retail meat case. Yet, the flavor of imported grass-fed beef may be very unique to domestic consumers. 
If consumers can taste flavor differences in beef from different countries, and if not all consumers prefer 
the same flavor, then country-of-origin labeling may be beneficial from a differentiated, branded product 
perspective.”  A similar remark about potential for differentiating beef from US and Canada is also made in 
Feuz et al (2007). 
7 The question is particularly puzzling given that the U.S. food marketing systems delivers about 300,000 
food products each year (Harris et al 2002). In 2008, a typical food retailer was estimated to carry 47,000 
distinct products (Brat et al 2009).  Even with MCOOL, suppliers may be able to market a differentiated 
product as generic.  For example, according to Kay (2008), “retailers and packers plan to use the catch-all 
label that says “Product of the U.S., Country X, and/or (as applicable) Country Y” on as much beef as 
possible. This label will apply to beef from animals that might have been foreign-born but were part raised 
and then processed in the U.S.  But the label can also be used on beef from cattle exclusively born, raised 
and slaughtered in the U.S.  In fact, the second-largest beef processor, Tyson Fresh Meats, has already told 
its customers it will adopt the catch-all label for all its beef. […] The bulk of beef sold at retail will remain 
a commodity.” 
8 Geographical indications (GIs) such as Protected Designation of Origin or Protected Geographical 
Indication have long been used by agricultural producers in the European Union.  GIs not only indicate 
  4suppliers to transmit information about product attributes to consumers, which they could 
not do prior to regulation.  However, as discussed in Krissoff et al (2004), there is little 
evidence that consumers systemically lack trust in the country-of-origin information 
provided by the U.S. food marketing system.
9   
When credible voluntary product origin labeling is possible, analyzing the effects 
of MCOOL requires assessing its scope.  That is, we need to allow the provision of 
information about product origin to be endogenously determined, identify conditions 
under which no information is provided in equilibrium, and compare equilibria with and 
without labeling (Carter et al 2006).  Such an economic analysis involves several 
modeling decisions that need justification.  First, because, unlike GIs, country of origin 
labeling (by itself) typically does not entail significant changes in production practices 
other than collecting information and keeping records about product movement (Federal 
Register 2009), we abstract from the vertical relations in the industry and assume that the 
labeling decision is made by a retailer.  Specifically, we consider a (local) monopoly firm 
that can source a good from two countries.
10   
Second, we consider a model of horizontal differentiation in which information 
about product origin provides an important cue to consumers who cannot identify the 
country of origin without labeling.  Thus the analysis does not apply to differentiation 
based on product attributes about the desirability of which all consumers agree (such as 
safety).  The present model applies to products with heterogeneity in individual match 
values (as in the case of beef from different countries described above), but it can be 
extended to include vertical differentiation as well. 
Third, we assume that the production costs (or wholesale prices) for products 
from different countries are subject to country-specific random shocks that are not 
observable to consumers.  Most of the commodities covered by the mandatory labeling 
policy (muscle cuts and ground meats, and fruits and vegetables) are characterized by 
                                                                                                                                                 
origin of the food product but also convey a certain quality and product specification (European 
Commission 2007). 
9 For example, it is telling that there were no retailers who participated in the voluntary labeling programs 
for beef and other products that were offered by USDA before the mandatory policy went into effect 
(Federal Register 2009, p. 2682).  This supports the assertion that the observed lack of COOL was not 
caused by the absence of credible third-party certification services (Krissoff et al 2004).   
10 See Bonanno and Lopez (2009) for recent evidence of monopoly pricing by supermarkets. The model 
can be extended to allow for competition among spatially differentiated retailers on a Hotelling line. 
  5relatively short shelf-life and seasonal variations in supply.  When domestic supply is low 
or unavailable, and storage is costly, off-season demand is met by imports (Huang and 
Huang 2007).
11  The imported and domestic varieties are typically marketed during 
different (possibly overlapping) time periods, and the likely primary reason why imports 
occur is not to offer additional varieties but to assure continuous consumer access to a 
“generic” product and stabilize retailer’s input costs throughout the year.
12  For example, 
several surveys of Belgium consumers found that origin-labeled meat products were 
perceived as less convenient to purchase due to reduced availability: “We might have to 
drive further to find this product”; “We don’t think it is available at our local butcher or 
in the supermarket we usually visit.” (cited in Verbeke and Roosen 2009, p. 28). 
We find that when the costs of sourcing similar (non-storable) products from 
different countries are variable, the strategy of product differentiation and segmenting the 
market by branding products with their country of origin is not always optimal.  
Withholding information about country of origin from consumers may allow the seller to 
achieve higher profits by enhancing his ability to take advantage of the changes in input 
prices and more frequently source the products from the low-cost country.  When 
wholesale prices for products from different countries exhibit idiosyncratic volatility and 
sources of supply can be adjusted to minimize input costs, the seller faces the following 
tradeoff when deciding whether to provide information about the product’s country of 
origin.  On the one hand, consumers who find their preferred variety are willing to pay 
more when the uncertainty about product origin is reduced, and the seller may achieve 
higher profits by raising the price of the labeled products.  On the other hand, consumers 
who do not find the variety that they prefer are willing to pay less, and may stay out of 
the market altogether.   
In contrast with the previous literature on labeling policies in food markets, in 
which information disclosure is incomplete due to certification costs, we show that a 
seller may prefer to withhold information about product attributes even when the cost of 
                                                 
11 This is true for many fruits and vegetables (and, to a smaller extent, beef and other meats) that are 
covered by the new labeling regulation. 
12 This assertion is indirectly supported by the observed opposition of retailers to MCOOL and the relative 
dearth of such labeling at the retail level. As reported in Kay (2008), “…any additional segregation of 
livestock and finished product will translate into higher wholesale prices and reduced product availability, 
Tyson warns.” (italics added) 
  6labeling (and certification of origin) is zero.  This result holds when (i) the dispersion of 
idiosyncratic shocks to wholesale prices in each country is sufficiently great, (ii) the 
correlation between shocks is sufficiently low, and (iii) the dispersion in consumer 
valuations for products from different countries is in some intermediate range. 
The intuition is as follows.  The first two conditions assure that the seller, on 
average, obtains significant cost savings by sourcing products from the low-cost country.  
The third condition assures that the seller achieves higher profits by keeping consumers 
ignorant about which variety is currently offered for sale.  More information about 
products increases the variability in the willingness to pay of consumers who differentiate 
between products based on the country of origin.  Specifically, the dispersion in the 
willingness to pay of the “choosy” consumers, whose actual valuations for different 
varieties are significantly different (i.e. high for some varieties but low for others), will 
increase by more than that for “indifferent” consumers whose valuations for different 
varieties are similar (i.e. uniformly high or uniformly low).  Whether or not this “uneven” 
increase in dispersion of consumer valuations allows the seller to achieve higher profits 
depends on the share of the “choosy” consumers in the market.   
If the share of the “choosy” consumers is sufficiently large, the seller achieves 
higher profits by withholding information about product origin as long as the social 
surplus from trade between the seller and consumers with low valuations is positive.  
Then the market price equals the expected valuation of a “choosy” consumer (who does 
not know which variety she encounters on a given shopping occasion).  Targeting 
uninformed “choosy” buyers allows the seller to extract more of the consumer surplus. 
Providing information about product origin increases neither the efficiency of allocation 
(the total surplus from trade) nor the seller’s profit when only products from the low-cost 
country are available for sale.
13  
                                                 
13 If the share of the “choosy” consumers is sufficiently small, the seller achieves higher profits by 
providing information about product origin.  When the share of consumers who are indifferent between 
varieties is large, the profit-maximizing seller targets an “indifferent” consumer.  Note that an “indifferent” 
consumer is well informed about her actual willingness to pay even without labeling since her willingness 
to pay varies little with variety.  As a result, the seller achieves higher profits when the “choosy” consumers 
are also informed about their actual valuations.  Then the seller’s gain from increasing sales to the “choosy” 
consumers who encountered their preferred variety will offset the loss from the foregone sales to the 
“choosy” consumers who encountered an undesirable variety (and discovered this before purchase). 
 
  7We also investigate how mandatory labeling affects welfare when the seller 
prefers to withhold information about product origin in the voluntary labeling regime.  
We identify three effects of mandatory labeling on welfare.  First, consumer welfare may 
increase or decrease depending on the profit-maximizing pricing strategy for labeled 
products; we refer to this as the price effect.  Second, under mandatory labeling 
consumers can access a greater number of product varieties if the seller prefers to supply 
not only products from the low-cost country but also products from the high-cost country; 
we refer to this as the more varieties effect.  Third, under mandatory labeling there is 
more efficient matching between consumers (with idiosyncratic tastes) and goods 
because consumers can identify the country of origin (variety) of a labeled product before 
purchase; we refer to this as the better matching effect.  While the more varieties and 
better matching effects of mandatory labeling on welfare are positive, the price effect can 
be either positive or negative. 
Our main result is that under certain conditions the price effect dominates, and 
mandatory labeling of products with country of origin (MCOOL) reduces (increases) 
welfare when the share of consumers with high valuations is sufficiently large (small).  
The intuition is that under mandatory provision of information about product origin, the 
seller cannot target the segment of uninformed “choosy” consumers since all consumers 
are informed about product variety, and is forced to either target consumers with low or 
high valuations.  Because the valuations of informed consumers are more dispersed, the 
equilibrium price may either increase or decrease compared with the equilibrium price 
without labeling.  Since the monopolist tends to undersupply compared with the efficient 
allocation, welfare increases or decreases depending on whether the profit-maximizing 
pricing strategy under mandatory labeling calls for lower or higher prices of the labeled 
(branded) products compared with the price of the unlabeled (generic) product. 
 We also comment on two extensions of the basic model.  We demonstrate that in 
a model with continuous distributions of valuations, consumer welfare can increase under 
mandatory labeling policy even if the equilibrium price remains unchanged.  This 
happens because information rent retained by consumers is greater when they know 
which variety they purchase.  We also discuss the effects of mandatory labeling on profits 
and the pricing strategy in a dynamic overlapping generations model with consumers who 
  8are initially uninformed and learn their valuations by purchasing and trying the product 
(Bergemann and Valimaki 2006).  In a dynamic model with learning there are two 
additional effects of labeling on long-run profits.  On the one hand, product origin 
labeling increases profits because inexperienced consumers are willing to pay more if 
they know which variety they buy since this will allow them to make better purchasing 
decisions in the future, and the informed choosy consumers are willing to pay more if 
their valuations happen to be high.  On the other hand, product origin labeling lowers 
profits because consumers with negative experiences (i.e. those with low valuations for 
one or both varieties) purchase less frequently.
14
 
1.1. Literature review 
Our paper is closely related to Wolinsky (1987).  The author is concerned with explaining 
the co-existence of, and price differentials between, the brand-name and generic (or 
private label) products.  In contrast with Wolinsky’s setting in which selling only 
unlabeled products cannot be a profit-maximizing marketing strategy, in our model all of 
the supply may be unlabeled in equilibrium.  The difference in equilibrium outcomes is 
due to the differences in the structure of consumer preferences and production 
technology.  We consider a model with random production costs that are private 
information to the seller and are not observable by the buyers.  Also, in our model 
“indifferent” buyers (who attribute relatively less importance to the differences between 
the brands) are not restricted to have a lower willingness to pay than that of “choosy” 
buyers for their preferred brand. 
While it is an empirical question, consumer willingness to pay for products with 
multiple experience and credence characteristics (e.g., flavor, nutritional content, product 
origin, and production practices) is perhaps better modeled using the demand structure 
proposed by Perloff and Salop (1985) rather than the one-dimensional spatial Hotelling’s 
model of horizontal differentiation.  Also, wholesale prices of many agricultural 
commodities covered under MCOOL are subjected to country-specific supply and 
                                                 
14 The analysis of a dynamic model depends on whether, without labels, consumers can tell which varieties 
they have already tried.  If they cannot, withholding product origin information benefits the seller because 
consumers with low valuations buy more frequently and stay in the market longer since they are not sure 
whether or not they have encountered both varieties in their previous trials and keep on hoping that the 
variety that they like is still out there. 
  9demand shocks, have high storage costs, and are not available off-season, which is 
consistent with the supply-side volatility in our model. 
As mentioned before, our paper complements recent studies (Zago and Pick 2004, 
Langinier and Babcock 2008, Moschini et al 2008) in the economics of GIs as credible 
quality certification devices in markets with vertical differentiation.  In contrast with 
these papers, which assume that credence (or experience) attributes cannot be credibly 
conveyed in the absence of regulation, we model the labeling decision as a profit-
maximizing marketing strategy and do not appeal to certification costs to explain the lack 
of voluntary labeling.   
The issue of whether a seller prefers to provide all of the relevant information 
about experience or credence attributes of a product is studied in Lewis and Sappington 
(1994), Johnson and Maytt (2006), and Saak (2008).  These authors identify conditions 
under which the seller achieves higher profits by releasing or withholding an informative 
signal (such as country of origin) which is private information to the buyer and not 
observable by the seller (in the sense that the seller does not know how country of origin 
affects the valuation of a particular buyer).  In contrast, we consider a multi-product seller 
with random production costs that are private information to the seller.
15  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we present a very 
simple model with a binary distribution of valuations.  In Section 3 we find conditions 
under which the seller prefers to withhold information about product origin when labeling 
is voluntary.  In Section 4 we analyze the effect of mandatory labeling policy on welfare.  
In Section 5 we discuss several extensions of the basic model with continuous 
distributions of valuations and consumers who learn about their valuations over time.  




                                                 
15 In general, country of origin information likely falls in between the settings with purely private and 
purely public (the seller knows how country of origin affects the valuation of a given buyer) information.  
The latter setting applies when consumers have common values (or more generally, when the distributions 
of valuations for products from different countries are asymmetric).  Ottaviani and Prat (2001) 
demonstrated that the monopolist always benefits from the release of public affiliated information.  And so, 
a greater asymmetry between products from different countries tends to make voluntary labeling more 
profitable. 
  102. Model 
Supply Side 
A monopolist (a grocery store) offers two varieties that are differentiated by country of 
origin,  A and B , for sale in a market consisting of a continuum of risk-neutral 
consumers with mass normalized to one.  The constant marginal production costs 
(wholesale prices) of both varieties  ,  i c B A i , = , are random and take two values:  0 = c  
and  0 > = c c , where  )) 0 , 0 ( ) , Pr(( = B A c c 4 / ) 1 ( )) , ( ) , Pr(( ρ + = = = c c c c B A , 
= = )) , 0 ( ) , Pr(( c c c B A 4 / ) 1 ( )) 0 , ( ) , Pr(( ρ − = = c c c B A  and  ] 1 , 1 [− ∈ ρ .
16  The parameter ρ  
is the coefficient of correlation between the random shocks in countries  A and B .  For 
example,  0 ≥ ρ  (positive correlation) may better describe the wholesale prices for beef 
produced in the U.S. and Canada, while  0 < ρ  (negative correlation) may better describe 
the wholesale prices for grapes produced in the U.S. and Chile which are typically not 
available at the same time (Huang and Huang 2007).  We assume that the realizations of 




Buyers can consume one unit of variety  A or one unit of variety B  or stay out of the 
market and obtain a reservation utility of zero.  Every consumer is characterized by his 
idiosyncratic willingness to pay for varieties  A and B , that are denoted by  A θ  and  B θ , 
where } , { H L i ∈ θ ,  , and  H L < < 0 c L < .  For simplicity, we assume that preferences 
are symmetric in the sense that aggregate preferences for each variety are independently 
and identically distributed (Perloff and Salop 1985).  The buyer’s valuation for each 
variety is either high H  with probability x or low L  with probability  , where 
, so that the shares of the “indifferent” consumers with 
x − 1
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ x ) , ( ) , ( H H B A = θ θ  and 
 are, respectively,   and  , and the share of the “choosy” consumers with  ) , ( L L
2 x
2 ) 1 ( x −
) , ( ) , ( H L B A = θ θ  or   is  ) , ( L H ) 1 ( x x − .   The valuations  A θ  and  B θ  are private 
information to each buyer, but the monopolist knows the distribution of valuations. 
                                                 
16 That is, the cost function in country i is  i i i i y c c y C = ) , ( , where   is the output in country i.  i y
17 That is, consumers do not observe prices in the input markets and do not know how the sources of supply 
switch between domestic and imported varieties over time. 
  11Product Labeling 
We consider two information regimes: voluntary and mandatory labeling of products 
with variety (i.e., their country of origin).  To focus on the demand side of the model, we 
assume that labeling of each product with variety is costless.  We assume that, if 
provided, labeling is truthful.  In the voluntary labeling regime, the monopolist decides 
whether or not to label products with variety (country of origin).  In the mandatory 
labeling regime, the monopolist must label each product with its variety (country of 
origin).  If a product is not labeled with its variety, a buyer cannot tell which variety she 
will buy.  For example, different varieties of meats, fruits, and vegetables can be similar 
in appearance but differ in flavor or other experience and credence attributes such as 
crunchiness, toughness, or nutritional content.   
 
Timing of decisions 
First, the monopolist decides whether to label products with variety and commits to the 
chosen labeling strategy.  Second, the monopolist observes his production costs   and 
.  If the monopolist decided to label, he sets the price for each variety,   and 
.  If the monopolist decided not to label, he sets the price of the unlabeled 
product,  .  Third, if the products are labeled, each consumer, upon seeing the 
variety and its price, decides whether to purchase or not.  If the products are not labeled, 
each consumer decides whether to purchase upon seeing only the price but not the 
product variety.  Fourth, the monopolist produces to satisfy demand. 
A c
B c ) , ( B A A c c p
) , ( B A B c c p
) , ( B A
N c c p
 
3. Voluntary Labeling 
3.1. Equilibrium with Labeling 
Consider an equilibrium in which the monopolist labels the products with variety.  A 
consumer with  ) , ( B A θ θ  buys variety i,  B A i , = , if  
(1) 0 ≥ − i i p θ , and 
(2)  j j i i p p − ≥ − θ θ ,  ,  B A j , = i j ≠ . 
  12Clearly, the seller’s (total) profits can only be maximized when the price for each variety 
offered for sale equals  L c c p B A i = ) , (  or H ,  B A i , = , since at optimum (1) and (2) 
cannot be slack for all consumers.   
Next we will characterize (ex post) equilibrium for different realizations of 
production costs (wholesale prices) for products from different countries.  We focus on a 
symmetric equilibrium with  ) , ( ) , ( B A B B A A c c p c c p =  when the production costs do not 
vary across countries,  . B A c c =
18  If the seller sets  L p p B A = =  then all consumers buy 
one unit of one of the varieties.  If the seller sets  H p p B A = = , then the share of 
consumers who purchase one unit of variety  A or one unit of variety B  is 
(3)  , 
2 2 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( x x x x x x − − = − + − +
which is an aggregation over all consumers with   who are indifferent between 
purchasing variety 
) , ( H H
A or B , plus all consumers with   who buy variety  ) , ( L H A, plus all 
consumers with   who buy variety  ) , ( H L B .   
And so, if the costs for products from both countries are low,  , 
using (3), the seller earns 
) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = B A c c
(4)  .  ] ) ) 1 ( 1 ( , max[ ) 0 , 0 (
2 H x L
L − − = π
If the production costs (wholesale prices) for products from both countries are high, i.e. 
, the seller offers both varieties at  ) , ( ) , ( c c c c B A = H c c p c c p B A = = ) , ( ) , (  if  , and 
earns 
H c ≤
(5)  .  ] 0 , max[ ) ) 1 ( 1 ( ) , (
2 c H x c c
L − − − = π
If the production costs (wholesale prices) vary across countries, i.e.   or 
, the optimal price for the product from a high-cost country, if it is offered 
for sale, must be  , and there are three possible profit-maximizing pricing strategies.   
) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A =
) 0 , ( ) , ( c c c B A =
c H ≥
For concreteness, suppose that  ) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A = .  (i) If the seller sets  L c pA = ) , 0 (  
and offers only products from country  A for sale then all consumers buy one unit of 
                                                 
18 If we assume that the marginal costs are strictly increasing, e.g.  ) , ( i i c y C ) ( i i y h c = , where   is a 
strictly increasing and convex function,  the average total cost is minimized by evenly splitting supply 
between the two countries whenever the cost shocks do not vary across countries.  The assumption that the 
marginal cost is constant simplifies the presentation, and does not affect the qualitative nature of the results. 
) ( i y h
  13variety  A and the seller earns L .  (ii) If the seller sets  L c pA = ) , 0 ( ,  and 
offers products from both countries for sale (but at different prices), then the share of 
consumers who purchase one unit of variety 
H c pB = ) , 0 (
A is 
(6)  ,  x x x x x x − + = − + − + 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 2 2
which is an aggregation over all consumers with   plus all consumers with   
plus all consumers with  .  The share of consumers who purchase variety 
) , ( H H ) , ( L H
) , ( L L B  is 
, which includes all consumers with  .  (iii) Finally, the seller may offer 
products from both countries for sale at equal prices, 
x x) 1 ( − ) , ( H L
= ) , 0 ( c pA H c pB = ) , 0 ( .  Then the 
share of consumers who purchase one unit of variety  A is given by  
(7)  ,   x x x x = − + ) 1 (
2
which includes all consumers with   and  , while the share of consumers 
who buy variety 
) , ( H H ) , ( L H
B  is the same as in case (ii).   
And so, using (6) and (7), the seller earns 
(8)    ], 0 , max[ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , max[ ) 0 , ( ) , 0 (
2 c H x x L x x L c c
L L − − + − + = = π π
]] 0 , max[ ) 1 ( c H x x xH − − + . 
Aggregating over all possible realizations of production costs and using (4), (5), and (8), 
we obtain the expected profits when the products are labeled with their country of origin: 
(9)  .  ∑∑
∈∈
= =
} , 0 {} , 0 {
) , ( )) , ( ) , Pr(( )] , ( [
c ac b
L
B A B A
L b a b a c c c c E π π
 
3.2. Equilibrium without Labeling 
Now suppose that in equilibrium the monopolist does not label the products with variety 
(country of origin).  We assume that the seller is equally likely to supply unlabeled 
products from country  A or B  when  B A c c = .  Because without labeling the seller 
cannot commit to supplying the more expensive variety and supplies only the cheaper 
variety if the production costs vary across countries, in a symmetric equilibrium variety A 
and variety B are equally likely to be supplied (since  ) Pr( ) Pr( a c a c B A = = =  for 
).  This implies that consumers, who purchase an unlabeled product, expect that 
they are equally likely to buy a product from country 
} , 0 { c a∈
A or B .  However, in equilibrium 
only “choosy” consumers, who value varieties differently, make their purchasing decision 
  14while being uncertain about their actual valuation for the purchased product which could 
turn out to be either the preferred or not preferred variety.  Without labeling the expected 
valuation for a consumer with   is  ) , ( L L L , the expected valuation for a consumer with 
 or   is  , and the expected valuation for a consumer with 
 is 
) , ( H L ) , ( L H H L 5 . 0 5 . 0 +
) , ( H H H .   
Clearly, when the products are not labeled the seller’s profits can only be 
maximized if the price equals    L c c p B A
N = ) , (,) ( 5 . 0 H L + , or H : 





)( ) 1 ( 1 ( , max[ ) 3 (
4
1
)] , ( [
2 2 H x H L x L c c E B A
N + − − − = ρ π  





max[ ) ) 1 ( 1 max[( ) 1 (
4
1 2 2 c H x c H L x − − + − − + + ρ . 
To understand (8) note that with probability  )) 0 , 0 ( ) , Pr( ) 0 ] , Pr(min[ = = = B A B A c c c c  
4 / ) 3 ( )) 0 , ( ) , Pr( )) , 0 ( ) , Pr( ρ − = = + = + c c c c c c B A B A  the seller sources products at a cost 
of zero, and with the complementary probability the input costs in both countries are 
high,  4 / ) 1 ( )) , ( ) , Pr(( ρ + = = c c c c B A .  If the seller sets  , all 
consumers except for those with 
= ) , ( B A
N c c p ) ( 5 . 0 H L +
) , ( ) , ( L L B A = θ θ  buy the unlabeled products, and if the 
seller sets  = ) , ( B A
N c c p H  only consumers with  ) , ( ) , ( H H B A = θ θ  make a purchase.  
Note that the profit-maximizing price of the unlabeled products offered for sale is 
independent of the realizations of production costs   and   when they vary across 
countries, i.e.  .  And so, the price of the unlabeled product does not 
reveal information about product origin to consumers.   
A c B c
) 0 , ( ) , 0 ( c p c p
N N =
Comparing the expected profits with labeling in (9) and without labeling in (10) 
gives 
 
Proposition 1.  (Voluntary labeling) There exists a threshold  1 ˆ − > ρ   such that whenever 
the correlation coefficient is lower than that threshold,  ρ ρ ˆ < , in equilibrium the 
products are not labeled with variety, only if  
(11a) 
) 1 ( 2
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.   
Otherwise, in equilibrium the products are labeled with variety. 
 
We find that the seller prefers not to label products when (i) the cost variability 
(volatility of wholesale prices) is sufficiently high, i.e. (11a) holds, (ii) the correlation 
between the country-specific shocks is sufficiently low (the supply is “sufficiently” 
seasonal and countries are geographically dispersed), and (iii) the dispersion in consumer 
valuations is not too high or too low, i.e. (11b) holds.
19  To understand the intuition, note 
that the monopolist earns lower profits without labeling when the production costs for 
products from different countries are the same (or sufficiently similar), i.e.   
 if  .  This is because by offering products from different countries 
that are labeled with their country of origin, the seller can segment the market and raise 
the prices at no additional cost.  
) , ( B A
L c c π
) , ( B A
N c c π ≥ B A c c =
However, if the input cost is lower in one of the countries,     or 
, the monopolist may earn higher profits by supplying the cheaper variety and 
withholding information about its identity from consumers, i.e.   
when (11) holds.  In the absence of information about country of origin of the variety 
offered for sale, there are three types of consumers: the consumer with uniformly low 
valuations, the uninformed “choosy” consumer, and the consumer with uniformly high 
valuations.  By targeting the uninformed “choosy” consumer the profit-maximizing seller 
achieves a balance between the volume of sales, which is higher than that obtained when 
the seller targets consumers with uniformly high valuations, and a price, which is higher 
than the willingness to pay of the consumers with uniformly low valuations.  These are 
optimal labeling and pricing strategies when the distribution of valuations is not too 
concentrated or dispersed, i.e. (11b) holds, and the wholesale price in the high-cost 
country is sufficiently high, i.e. (11a) holds.  And so, if the probability that the input costs 
) , ( B A c c ) , 0 ( c =
) 0 , (c
) , ( B A
L c c π ) , ( B A
N c c π <
                                                 
19 There exists a range of parameters such that Proposition 1 continues to hold when  0 ≥ ρ  but not too 
large.  For example, if we assume that the country-specific shocks are independent, i.e.  0 = ρ , and  , 
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+ .   
  16are different across countries is high (i.e. ρ  is not too high), the monopolist achieves 
higher expected profits by withholding information about product origin from consumers.   
On the other hand, if the population of consumers is dominated by consumers 
with either high or low valuations (i.e. x is sufficiently close to 0 or 1), the seller 
achieves higher profits by providing information about product origin even when the 
entire supply is sourced from a single (low-cost) country.
20  Because the seller always 
achieves higher profits by offering and labeling products from different countries when 
the input cost are similar across countries, providing information about product origin 
becomes a profit-maximizing marketing strategy. 
 
4. Mandatory Labeling and Welfare   
By the usual revealed preference argument, the monopolist’s profits cannot increase 
under mandatory labeling.  If the share of consumers with high valuations is sufficiently 
small or large, i.e. (11b) does not hold, or the dispersion in input costs is too small, i.e. 
(11a) does not hold, or country-specific shocks are too strongly positively correlated, 
mandatory labeling policy has trivially no effect since in equilibrium the seller either 
voluntarily labels the products with variety or the provision of information about origin 
does not change the equilibrium outcome and welfare (see footnote 19).  However, if the 
share of consumers with high valuations is in some intermediate range, i.e. (11b) holds, 
the dispersion in input costs is sufficiently great, i.e. (11a) holds, and the correlation 
between the country-specific shocks is sufficiently low, the expected social welfare may 
increase or decrease under mandatory labeling.    
 
Proposition 2. (Mandatory labeling and welfare) Suppose that there is no labeling in 
equilibrium with voluntary labeling, i.e. (11) holds and the correlation coefficient ρ  is 
not too high.  The effect of mandatory labeling on welfare is  
- positive, if   and  xH L ≥





− ≥ ; 
                                                 
20 If   and  , i.e. the seller never sources products from high-cost countries and covers the 
market when the input costs are low, the seller is indifferent between labeling and not labeling.  However, 
this indifference is special to the binary setting, and does not occur in a more general model with 
continuous distributions of valuations and input costs (see Section 5.1). 
H c ≥ xH L ≥
  17- negative, if  , c is sufficiently large, and  xH L < ρ  is sufficiently small. 
 
When the seller prefers to withhold the product origin information in the 
voluntary labeling equilibrium, mandatory labeling affects welfare via its effects on (i) 
the equilibrium price (the “price effect”), (ii) the number of varieties offered for sale (the 
“more varieties effect”), and (iii) the efficiency of matching between the “choosy” 
consumers and their preferred varieties (the “better matching effect”).  As shown in 
Proposition 1, if in equilibrium with voluntary labeling the monopolist does not label, he 
sets   for all   such that  ) , ( B A
N c c p ) ( 5 . 0 H L + = B A c c , 0 ] , min[ = B A c c , and the share of 
consumers who derive utility H  from consumption is  
(12)  x x x x x x x = − + + − + ) ) 1 ( (
2
1
)) 1 ( (
2
1 2 2 , 
while the share of consumers who derive utility L  from consumption is 






x x x x x x − = − + − . 
If  , the seller may prefer to set   so that only consumers 
with   buy the unlabeled product. 
c c c B A = ] , min[ H c c p B A
N = ) , (
) , ( H H
It is easy to verify that in the outcomes in which the input costs are the same 
across countries,   or  , mandatory labeling necessarily raises (ex 
post) welfare.
) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = B A c c ) , ( c c
21  Even though under mandatory labeling the seller may raise the prices for 
products from different countries when the input costs are the same, there are more 
varieties offered for sale and better matching between goods and consumers.  As a result, 
the number of consumers who participate in the market remains unchanged or increases 
compared with the equilibrium without labeling. This is because “choosy” consumers are 
able to find their preferred variety when products from both countries are offered for 
sale.  This prevents the amount of trade from falling due to higher equilibrium prices.  
However, as we will see next, the effect of mandatory labeling on welfare is ambiguous 
when the input costs differ across countries, i.e.  ) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A =  or  .  ) 0 , (c
                                                 
21 As shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix,   
 for   and  , where   , 
) , ( B A
ML c c W ] 0 , max[ ) ) 1 ( 1 (
2
i c H x − − − =
) , ( B A
VL c c W ≥ ) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = B A c c ) , ( c c ) , ( B A
k c c W VL ML k , = ,  is social welfare in the 
mandatory and voluntary labeling regimes. 
  18To isolate the “price effect” of mandatory labeling on expected welfare, we 
consider a special case with  1 − = ρ  and  .  When  , the seller supplies only 
products from a country with 
H c ≥ H c ≥
0 = i c  because selling products from a country with  c ci =  
cannot generate positive surplus from trade.  Hence, the “more varieties effect” of 
mandatory labeling on welfare is absent when the input costs differ across countries 
because with and without labeling all of the supply comes from a country with  .  
When, in addition, 
0 = i c
1 − = ρ , there are only two possible outcomes:   and 
.  Hence, the “better matching effect” of mandatory labeling on welfare also 
vanishes because consumers never have access to products from both countries at the 
same time.
) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A =
) 0 , (c
22  And so, the only remaining effect of mandatory labeling on welfare is the 
“price effect”, which can be positive or negative.  It is analyzed next. 
Using (12) and (13) to aggregate utilities over all consumers, welfare in 
equilibrium without labeling is   for   or 
, since all consumers except for those with   buy the unlabeled product.  
Hence, expected welfare when the monopolist does not to label is
L x x xH c c W B A
VL ) 1 ( ) , ( − + = ) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A =
) 0 , (c ) , ( L L
23
(14)  .  L x x xH c c W E B A
VL ) 1 ( )] , ( [ − + =
First, we consider the case with  L xH < .  When the input costs vary across 
countries, by (8), the introduction of mandatory labeling leads to a lower price of the 
offered variety with  ,  , and welfare increases:   0 = i c ) , ( B A i c c p ) , ( B A
N c c p L < =
(15)    ) , ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) , ( B A
VL
B A
ML c c W L x x xH L x xH c c W = − + > − + =
for   or  .  Under mandatory labeling, the share of consumers who 
derive utility 
) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A = ) 0 , (c
H  from consumption is the same as in (12), and the share of consumers 
who derive utility L  from consumption is 
(16)  x x x x x x x − = − + − + − + − 1 ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( (
2
1
) ) 1 ( ) 1 ((
2
1 2 2 . 
                                                 
22 As discussed above, both of these effects of mandatory labeling on welfare are positive, i.e. if the prices 
of labeled products were set to equal the price of the unlabeled product, expected welfare would necessarily 
increase under mandatory labeling. 
23 Recall that in a special case with  1 − = ρ  and  , in equilibrium only one variety is supplied at a time 
because 
H c ≥
2 / 1 )) 0 , ( ) , Pr(( )) , 0 ( ) , Pr(( = = = = c c c c c c B A B A  and sourcing products from a high-cost country 
cannot generate positive profits. 
  19Aggregating utilities over all consumers, using (12) and (16), gives overall welfare under 
mandatory labeling in (15).  Expected welfare increases,   
, because consumers with   participate under mandatory labeling, 
and the social surplus from trade between the seller and each consumer (even those with 
uniformly low valuations) is positive.  And so, if there is a large share of consumers with 
low valuations and sufficiently dispersed input costs, the introduction of mandatory 
labeling leads to lower equilibrium prices and makes consumers better off.   
)] , ( [ B A
ML c c W E
)] , ( [ B A
VL c c W E > ) , ( L L
On the other hand, when  xH L <  and the input costs vary across countries, by 
(8), the introduction of mandatory labeling leads to a higher equilibrium price of the 
offered variety with  ,  0 = i c ) , ( B A i c c p > = H ) , ( B A
N c c p , and welfare falls: 
    ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( B A
VL
B A
ML c c W L x x xH xH c c W = − + < =
for   or  .  Now under mandatory labeling consumers with  ) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A = ) 0 , (c L i = θ , 
who are offered variety i,  , do not participate in the market.  This reduces 
welfare because in the efficient allocation the seller trades with all consumers.
B A i , =
24  Since 
the amount of trade is reduced while the number of varieties and the efficiency of 
matches between consumers and products are unchanged, there is also a reduction in 
overall welfare when the input costs vary across countries.   
However, recall that welfare is necessarily higher under the mandatory labeling 
policy when input costs are the same in each country,   for 
 and  .  Therefore, even if there are realizations of input costs such 
that labeled product prices rise following the introduction of mandatory labeling, 
expected welfare will decrease only if similar input costs are sufficiently unlikely (i.e. the 
correlation coefficient 
) , ( B A
ML c c W ) , ( B A
VL c c W ≥
) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = B A c c ) , ( c c




                                                 
24 Even though consumers are better informed about their valuations under mandatory labeling, they do not 
obtain information rents because in a binary setting the seller is able to extract all surplus from trade when 
,  .  A more general model in which consumers retain positive information rents is 
analyzed in Section 5.1. 
H c c p B A i = ) , ( B A i , =
  20 
5. Extensions 
5.1. More general distribution of consumer valuations 
In this section we show that the seller may prefer to withhold information about produc
origin, and that mandatory labeling policy may increas
t 
e or decrease welfare in a more 
general
We now s
 setting with continuous distributions. 
 suppo e that the space of consumer valuations is an interval:  , [ H L i ∈ ] θ  
with  L ≤ 0 H < , and  i θ  is continuously distributed on  ] , [ H L  in accordance with t
marginal distribution function  ) ( i F
he 
θ ,  B A i , = .  As be ations of each 
consumer,  A
fore, the valu
θ  and  B θ ,  e drawn independen ar y.  Let tl   ∫ = v  that  ) (θ θdF .  Also, suppose
the input costs  A c  and  B c  are distributed on  ] ,c 0 [ ] , 0 [ c ×  and a
con s sym ic distribution function 
re drawn from the 
t , where   for 
all 
inuou metr ) , ( B A c c G ) , ( ) , ( A B B A c c G c c G =
B  and  A c c , 0 > c .   
If the products are labeled, by (1) and (2), the measure of consumers who 
purchase variety   is now given by  
i p i A i p F p p D ) ( ( )) 1 ( ) ( θ ,  




+ − − + − = − − i i i B dF p p F F p )) ( 1 ( ) ( , θ
  A i = − B i =  and  , if  B i = − A i = wher , and the seller earns 
B A i p p B A
L D c c
B A
= ∑ = π (17) ) )( , ( i i B A i c p p p − . 
Let 
max ) , (
, ,
+ ℜ → × ] , 0 [ ] , 0 [ : ) , ( ˆ c c c c p B A i  denote a solution to (17),  B A i , = .  When the 
products are labeled with variety, welfare for given realiz
 is given by 
− − + − = i
L dF dF c dF c p F c c W ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ ( ) , ( θ θ θ θ θ . 
If the seller does not label products with variety, all consumers with 
≥ −
N p  
ations of the input costs 




−− − B A i
pp p p i i i i i B A
ii i i i ,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ θ
(18)  ( 5 . 0 + B A θ θ
purchase because  5 . ) ] , Pr(min[
0 )
0 = = i B A c c c  for each  B A i , = , and an unlabeled product 
is equally likely to originate in country  A or B .  By (18), the measure of consumers who 
purchase unlabeled products is given by  
  21∫ − =
H N N p F p D 2 ( 1 ( ) ( −
L
N dF ) ( )) θ θ ,  




N p p D c
N = π
Let , ( ˆ B A
N c c p
(19)  ]) , min[ B A
N c c c − . 
) 
)( ( max ) , (
  + ℜ → × ] , 0 [ ] , 0 [ : c c  denote a solution to (19).  Note that  ) , ( ˆ
N c c p  
) , ( ˆ A B
N c c p =  so that consumers cannot update their beliefs about the origin of unlabeled 
B A
products after observing the price.  When the products are not labeled, welfare for given 
realizations of the input costs   is given by  ) , ( B A c c
∫∫ − + =
N p B A
m
B A B A
N dF dF c c c W
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Example.  Suppose that the distributi
)






A dF dF c
ˆ 2
ˆ 2 ) ( ) (
θ θ θ )( ˆ 2 ( 1 (
B
where ] , min[ B A
m c c c = .  The following example illustrates. 
on of valuations is given by 
θ θ
− − = e F 1 ) ( f o r  
) , 0 [ ∞ ∈ θ .  Then, when the pr
p p
B A i
− , and for a particular realizat
product prices welfare is  B W
oducts are labeled, demand for products from country i is 
i p e e p p D
− − − = 5 . 0 ) , (
, , , ( A B A
L p p c c
B A ions of the input costs and 
) ∑ = + = i p 1 (
i p
i e c
− − ) ) ( 5 . 0 i i c p − −  
B A p p e
− − .  For any fixed 
B A i ,
 and very large 
become: 






∞ → − = π
B A B cB
large the profit-maximizing price for (labeled) products from country 
A c B c , the profits when the products are labeled 
) 1 ) ) , ( ˆ )))( , ( ˆ (
A c
A B A A B A A e c c c p c c p F
+ = − , 
since  ∞ = ) , ( ˆ lim c c p , and it is easy to verify that for all c  that are sufficiently 
(
∞ → B
A is approximately 
 
B ∞ →
When the products   for the unlabel  produ s is 
 and ex post welfare is  B A
N c W
A B A A c c c p + =1 ) , ( ˆ lim . 
are not labeled, demand ed ct
) , ,
N p c  
N p e
2 − =  
c
) 2 1 ( ) (




  22)) 1 ( 2 1 (
N N p p + +
N N p D ( − ximizing price
of the unlabeled products is  , ( ˆ A
N c p
m c 4 2 ( +
m c ) , where  .  The profit-ma  
B c
] , min[ B A
m c c c =
) = 8 / ) 16 ) (
2 + + 4 2+
m c .  Evaluating 
thout labeling at profits with and wi   0 = A c  and letting  ∞ → B c  yields 
  ) , e cB
8 . 0
s 
are is high t labeling because the price of the 
< ≈
∞ → 37 . 0 0 ( lim
1 L
cB
π ) , 0 ( 8 . 0 ) 8 . 0 2 1 42 . 0
2
B
N c e π = ⋅ ⋅ + ≈
⋅ −  
Because ) , 0 ( B
N c π  does not depend on  B c , continuity of the profit functions in 
A c ,  B c  implies that the monopolist achieves higher expected profits without labeling a
long as the distribution of the input costs is sufficiently dispersed and the realizations 
with different costs across countries are sufficiently likely (i.e. the random shocks are 
independent or negatively dependent).  Also, when the input cost in one of the countries 
is sufficiently high ( ∞ → B c ), welf




= < + = 1 8 / ) 20 2 ( ) , 0 ( ˆ B
N c p ) , 0 ( ˆ lim B A c c p
B ∞ → , and the 
 country  monopolist supplies only products from A with or without labeling: 






B B B A
L c p c W e c p c p W ≈ < ≈ =
−
When  A c  is small and  B c  is large, the mandatory labeling policy decreases 
welfare because the negative “price” effect dominates the positive “more varieties”
“better matching” effects.  When, under mandatory labeling, the market shares of 
products from different countries are very different (e.g., the market share of country 





products goes to zero as  ∞ → B c ), the “more varieties” effect vanishes and the gains in 




out of the market.   
However, as shown in Figure 1, when the outcomes with similar input costs 
across countries are likely, the effect of mandatory labeling on welfare is ambiguous an
depends on the degree of the dispersion of the input costs.  Figure 1 plots the expecte
profits and welfare with and without labeling when the input cost in each country is 
drawn independently from a uniform distribution on  ] , 0 [ c  for different values of c  (a 
  23measure of dispersion in the input costs).
25  When the dispersion is sufficiently small, 
67 < c , the monopolist achieves higher expected profits with labeling, and mandatory 
labeling policy has trivially no effect on welfare since labeling is provided voluntarily.  
When the dispersion is in some intermediate range,  108 67 < ≤ c , mandatory labeling 
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When the dispersion is not too high ( 108 < c ), mandatory labeling assures that 
products from both countries are purchased by a large number of consumers sufficiently 
frequently.  Then the increase in welfare due to more varieties and better matching of 
goods and consumers (since consumers know their actual valuation before they purchase
a labeled product) offsets the decrease in welfare due to higher prices for the labeled 
products.  However, as the dispersion in the input costs increases, the products from the
lower-cost country are more likely to have a significant share of the market, and there are




untries.  Then the 
                                                 
25 For example, the expected difference between the input costs in the high-cost and low-cost country is 






]] , min[ ] , [max[ = − = − .   c
  24decreas
ffect of 
mandatory labeling on consum
on of 
mandatory labeling policy, the profit-maximizing price remains unchanged, 
B A i c c  for some  , consumers will be made strictly better off.  By (18), the 
[ B A
L
B A p θ θ − +
ide is the average consumer surplus (information rent) with 
labeling when  i
N c c p p = .  Formally, the inequality follows because function 
 is subadditive, i.e. 
e in welfare due to higher prices for the labeled products is more likely to offset 
the increase in welfare due to more varieties and better matching. ■ 
 
Allowing for a more general distribution of tastes also reveals a new e
er welfare that is absent in the setting with binary 
valuations: increase in the information rent.  That is, even if, upon the introducti
) , ( ˆ B A
N c c p  
) , ( ˆ p = ) , ( B A c c
average consumer surplus (information rent) in equilibrium without labeling is 
(20)  ) ( ) ( ] 0 , ˆ max
H H
L
N dF dF θ θ ∫∫ ∫ − ≤
H
N dF p ) ( ] 0 , ˆ max[ θ θ ,  ) ( 5 . 0
L
where the right-hand s
) , ( ˆ ˆ B A





) ] 0 , ˆ max[ 5 . 0 ] 0 , ˆ max[ 5 . 0 ] 0 , ˆ ) ( 5 . 0 ax[ B A B A p p p − + − ≤ − + θ θ θ θ   
holds for all  B A p ˆ , ,θ θ .  Aggregating (21) over all po atio
m
N   ) , ( B A θ θ  gives 
duct is  (20).  The intuition is that a consumer who knows whether his valuation for the pro
A θ  or  B θ , can make a wiser purchasing decision compared with the consumer who
knows the average of the possible actual valuations,  ) ( 5 . 0 B A
 only 
θ θ + .   
  To simplify the presentation we assumed that the marginal distributions of 
valuations and input costs for products from different countries are the same.  The 
analysis can be easily extended to allow for asymmetric distributions.  Because the sel
is constrained to set the same pric
ler 
e for both varieties when the products are not labeled, 
ut can vary prices in the labeling regime, the seller is more likely to achieve higher 
 costs differ across 
valuations for each variety.  A more realistic assumption is that consumers are initially 
b
profits with labeling when the distributions of valuations and input
varieties (also, see footnote 15).  
 
5.2. Consumer learning from experience and dynamic pricing 
In the basic setting in Section 3 we assumed that consumers (privately) know their 
  25uninformed about their match values for different varieties and learn from the previous
consumption experience.  Next we discuss how 
 
our analysis in the static setting can be 
extended to a dynamic model with forward-looking agents (Bergemann and Valimaki 
2006).  
Consider a stationary discrete-time model with  ∞ < < ∞ − t  and a positive 
discount rate  ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ δ .  As in the static model, in each period a monopolist (priva
observes the realizations of the input costs and offers two varieties, A and B, of a non-
durable, non-storable good for sale in a market consisting of a unit continuum of 
consumers.  A consumer that is alive at date t remains in the market up to date  1 + t  wi
probability  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈
tely) 
th 
λ .  For each consumer who exits the market a new consumer arrives, 
so that the size of the population of consumers remains constant but there is a constant 
renewal of the customer base.  For example, due to changes in income, health conditions, 
or dieta he 
er 
il g 
hases.  O t for 
ry restrictions, consumers may flow in and out of the market for red meats.  T
production and labeling technologies are the same as in the basic model.   
In contrast with the basic model, we now assume that when a consumer first 
enters the market she only knows the distribution of valuations (the common prior) rath
than her actual tastes.  Then forward-looking consumers will view a purchase (at least, 
initially) not only as providing immediate ut ity of consumption but also as providin
information about the expected benefits from future purc ne can show tha
sufficiently high values of the discount rate δ  (i.e. when consumers are sufficiently 
patient) and sufficiently low values of the turnover rate  λ λ / ) 1 ( −  (i.e. when the 





rium in Section 3.  And so, the static model can be viewed as the steady state of 
the dynamic model with very long-lived consumers. 
However, with forward-looking consumers, the provision of information abou
product origin has two additional “dynamic” effects that are absent in the static setting: 
(i) Inexperienced consumers (i.e. those who have not tried one or both varieties) a
willing to pay more because they will be able to make better purchasing decisions in the
future if they know which variety they buy today; (ii) Incompletely experienced 
consumers (i.e. those who have tried only one variety) with a negative experience (i.e. 
  26those w
stop buyin    
ith low valuations for one or both varieties) may buy less frequently since they 
g the variety for which they have low valuations as soon as they learn about it.
It can be shown that in sufficiently stable markets (i.e. with a low turnover rate 
λ λ / ) 1 ( − ), the second effect dominates when the conditions in (11) hold, and the sell
achieves higher steady-state profits by withholding information about product origin.  
Then the profit-maximizing pricing strategy is to target a segment of consumers who 
found out that they have low valuations for one of the varieties but are yet to exper
the other variety.  Using this pricing strategy, th
er 
ience 
e monopolist increases sales because 
completely informed consumers with actual uniformly low valuations buy more 
he products are unlabeled.     
t 
hen 
model that allow 










6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown that in a setting with private valuations the multi-produc
monopolist prefers to provide or withhold information about product variety (country of 
origin) depending on the distributions of valuations and input costs (country-specific 
wholesale prices).  No information about product origin is provided in equilibrium w
idiosyncratic input price volatility is sufficiently great, and the dispersion of consumer 
valuations is not too small or too great.  We have also found that, in a simple binary 
setting, MCOOL increases or decreases welfare depending on the share of consumers 
with high valuations.  We have discussed several extensions of the basic 
e general distributions of valuations and input costs, and consumers learning thei
valuations by buying and trying the products in a dynamic framework.   
We have endogenized the provision of COOL under voluntary labeling, and our
explanation of the lack of voluntary COOL on a large scale does not hinge on the costs o
labeling.  We have demonstrated that a market failure in the provision of COOL may, 
indeed, occur with the attending need for policy intervention, which may or may not be
the MCOOL policy.  A common finding in the previous empirical studies of COOL (e.g.,
Lusk and Anderson 2004, Brester et al 2004, Awada and Yanika 2006, Alejand
2008) is that a sufficient increase in demand for the products labeled with the country 
origin is necessary for MCOOL to have a positive effect on welfare due to the 
implementation costs imposed by the policy.  In contrast, our model shows that even 
  27when the implementation cost is zero, MCOOL may have a negative effect on welfare.
However,
  




s quality differentiation 
d wholesale price volatility of agricultural products from different countries (regions) 
may be important determinants of the seller’s labeling decision. 
  
ion in consumer valuations and input costs the effect of MCOOL on welfare is 
positive. 
Many agricultural markets are characterized by aggregate uncertainty relatin
the quality attributes of food products rather than idiosyncratic uncertainty studied in 
paper.  A recurring pattern of food safety failures and contaminated food products 
indicates that a model with common values for the seller’s products is perhaps more 
suitable for studying the conditions under which the seller prefers to provide or withhold 
information about product origin and analyzing the welfare implications of mandatory 
provision of such information.  Nonetheless, even in such setting
an
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  32Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1:  From (9) and (10) it follows that the monopolist can achieve 
higher profits when the products are not labeled only if the profit-maximizing price 
without labeling is  = ) , ( B A
N c c p ) ( 5 . 0 H L +  for all   such that  , i.e. 
if  .  So we suppose that this is the case.  Then 
when the products are labeled, the monopolist sets the prices at  ,   , 
when  , because, by assumption,   
B A c c , 0 ] , min[ = B A c c
] , max[ ) )( ) 1 ( 1 ( 5 . 0
2 2 H x L H L x > + − −
H pi = ) 0 , 0 ( B A i , =
) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = B A c c ) )( ) 1 ( 1 ( 5 . 0 ) ) 1 ( 1 (
2 2 H L x H x + − − > − −
L > .  And so, using (4) and (5), it is easy to verify that   for 
 and  .  Also, by (8), it follows that   for 
 and   if both conditions in (11) hold.  Therefore, by (9) and (10), we 
have  
) , ( ) , ( B A
N
B A
L c c c c π π ≥
) 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = B A c c ) , ( c c ) , ( ) , ( B A
N
B A
L c c c c π π <
) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A = ) 0 , (c
)] , ( [ )] , ( [ B A
N
B A
L c c E c c E π π <  when  1 − = ρ , 
)] , ( [ )] , ( [ B A
N
B A
L c c E c c E π π >  when  1 = ρ , 
and  
   is increasing in  )] , ( [ )] , ( [ B A
N
B A
L c c E c c E π π − ρ . 
Hence, by continuity, it follows that there exists  1 ˆ − > ρ  such that for all  ) ˆ , 1 [ ρ ρ − ∈  the 
monopolist achieves higher profits without labeling, i.e.  , 
only if (11) holds. ■ 
)] , ( [ )] , ( [ B A
N
B A
L c c E c c E π π <
 
Proof of Proposition 2: If the monopolist does not label products when labeling is 
voluntary, by Proposition 1, (11) must hold.  Then under mandatory labeling the seller 
sets     since, by (11b),  .  Also, when 
 or   the monopolist either offers only products from a 
low-cost country with   or sets 
H pi = ) 0 , 0 (, B A i , = L H x > − − ) ) 1 ( 1 (
2
) , 0 ( ) , ( c c c B A = ) 0 , ( ) , ( c c c B A =
0 = i c H c c p c c p B A B B A A = = ) , ( ) , (  when products from 
both countries are offered for sale since 
 , max[ ) 0 , ( ) , 0 ( L c c
L L = = π π ]] 0 , max[ ) 1 ( c H x x xH − − +  
  ,  ] 0 , max[ ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 c H x x L x x − − + − + >
  33where the inequality follows by (11b).  And so, under mandatory labeling welfare for 
different realizations of input costs   is given by  ) , ( B A c c
(A1a)  ,  H x W
ML ) ) 1 ( 1 ( ) 0 , 0 (
2 − − =






≥ − − + − − +
=
otherwise   if   , ) 1 (
] 0 , max[ ) 1 (   if   ], 0 , max[ ) 1 (
L x xH
L c H x x xH c H x x xH
, 
(A1c)  .  ] 0 , max[ )) 1 ( 2 ( ) , (
2 c H x x x c c W
ML − − + =
When labeling is voluntary and the monopolist prefers not to label, welfare for 
different realizations of the input costs   is given by  ) , ( B A c c
(A2a)  ,  L x x xH c W c W W
VL VL VL ) 1 ( ) 0 , ( ) , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 ( − + = = =
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It is straightforward to verify that   for all   when 
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− ≡ > .  Hence, we have   
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  Now suppose that   and  .  Then, by (A1) and (A2), we have   xH L < H c ≥
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.  Hence, from (A1) it follows that, by continuity of 
 in   and  , the inequality continues to hold for all c that are sufficiently 
close to 
) , ( B A
ML c c W A c B c
H  and all ρ  that are sufficiently close to  1 − . ■ 
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